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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of 
the Estate of J. PARRY BOWEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CULBERT L. OLSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
* * * * * 
CULBERT L. OLSON, 
Cross-Complainant and Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANCES H. BOWEN, Administratrix of 
the Estate of J. PARRY BOWEN, et al., 
Cross-Defendants and Appellants. 
APPE~TS'BRIEF 
PREFACE 
Case No. 
8060 
In this appeal the question is not one of the facts 
found by the Lower Court in his Memorandum Decision 
(Rec. 63-86), but rather that the Lower Court erred in con-
struing the law as applied to those facts in the following 
particulars: 
1. In interpreting the facts shown in his Memorandum 
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Decision (Rec. 63-86) into his Findings of Fact (Rec. 
97-102). 
2. That the conclusions of law, and decree are clearly 
against both the law, and the evidence as found in said 
Memorandum Decision. 
The facts are not disputed only in a few very minor 
particulars as they are set forth in said Memorandum De-
cision and in such instances they are pointed out. Except as 
hereinafter pointed out, the facts as set forth in saiq Mem-
orandum Decision are referred to as controlling in this brief. 
However, appellants do not accept any conclusions of law 
that may be made by the lower court on the legal effect of 
the failure to pay the 1947 and 1948 taxes before they be-
came delinquent on November 30th of each respective year, 
nor the legal conclusions that such failure terminated the 
adverse possession of the plaintiffs. 
FACTS 
This action was commenced by the filing of a com-
plaint (Rec. 1-6) on September 22, 1948. The complaint 
was in the so-called "short form" and did not allege adverse 
possession or the payment of taxes. A considerable amount 
of land was involved other than the 80 acres of land in-
volved in this action and appeal, and described as the North 
half of the Southwest quarter of Section 34, in Township 
1 South of Range 1 East of the Uintah Special Meridian. 
The plaintiff, J. Parry Bowen also known as J. Perry Bowen, 
has died since the commencement of the action, and Fran-
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ces H. Bowen, Administratrix of the Estate of J. Parry 
Bowen, Deceased, has been substituted as a party plaintiff. 
However, at the time of the commencement of this action, 
J. Parry Bowen had no interest in the lands involved in 
this appeal, he having conveyed all of his right, title and 
interest in the lands to Keith J. Bowen on April 26th, 1947 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 55). 
The defendant and respondent, Culbert L. Olson, filed 
an "Answer" (Rec. 7-8) which is verified on October 21st, 
1949 but bears no filing date. In this purported answer, 
the defendant makes no claim whatsoever to any particu-
lar piece of the property involved in the action by definitely 
describing the same. He makes no affirmative allegations 
claiming ownership of the subject property. 
On January 9th, 1950, defendant and appellant, Culbert 
L. Olson, filed a "Cross-Complaint" (Rec. 17-20), which was 
followed by his ''FIRST AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT'' 
(Rec. 21-25), filed March 31st, 1950; his "SECOND AMEN-
DED CROSS-COMPLAINT" (Rec. 26-30) filed April 27th, 
1950; his "THIRD AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT" (Rec. 
31-36), filed April 28th, 1950; and his "CROSS-COM-
PLAINT of Defendant CULBERT L. OLSON, Amending 
and Replacing His Third Amended Cross-Complaint (Rec. 
43-50). Cross-Complainant Olson made his first claim of 
ownership and possession of the subject land in his first 
Cross-Complaint, and prayed for a judgment quieting his 
title to that particular land for the first time. His succeed-
ing cross-complaints likewise prayed that his title be quieted 
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although they changed their substance. 
On April 21st, 1950, defendant Olson filed his "AMEN-
DED ANSWER OF CULBERT L. OLSON" (Rec. 12-14) 
in which he made a counter-claim for the first time and in 
which he alleged ownership and possession and the necess-
ary requisites for a short form in an action to quiet title. 
lie prayed that his title be quited to the subject lands. 
On April 3rd, 1950, in their "ANSWER TO FIRST 
AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT", the plaintiffs and 
cross-defendants alleged the necessary requisites of adverse 
possession and that they "have paid all taxes and assess-
ments levied or assessed thereon during said period." 
In all subsequent pleadings of the plaintiffs and cross-
defendants, namely: "ANSWER TO TIITRD AMENDED 
CROSS COMPLAINT" (Rec. 40-42) filed May 2nd, 1950; 
''ANSWER TO CROSS COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT 
CULBERT L. OLSON AMENDING AND REPLACING 
HIS THIRD AMENDED CROSS COMPLAINT" (Rec. 51-
55), filed May 27th, 1950; and "ANSWER TO CROSS-
CLAIM, IN AMENDED ANSWER" (Rec. 15-16), filed Sep-
tember 21st, 1950; the plaintiffs and cross defendants alleg-
ed the necessary facts constituting adverse possession for 
seven years and the payment of all taxes levied or assessed 
during said period, as well as limitations and laches. 
The cause was tried before the court without a jury from 
December 9th to December 12, 1952 (Rec. 97). 
The trial court filed his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 
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63-86) on January 27th, 1953, in which he reviewed the evi-
dence, and which decision contained, among other things 
the matters shown in the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhib-
it J) as follows: 
1. Defendant and cross-complainant, Culbert L. Olson, 
obtained title to the subject lands by Sheriff's Deed dated 
February 25th, 1916, recorded March 3rd, 1916, in Book 
"20" of Deeds, pages 35-36 (pages 26-27.) 
2. Defendant and cross-complainant, Culbert L. Olson, 
failed to pay the taxes for the year 1933, and subsequent 
taxes for the years 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937, and a tax 
sale was made of the property dated December 21st, 1933, 
as shown in Tax Sale Record for the year 1933, page 32, 
line 9, Tax Sale No. 413 (page 32). 
3. Auditor's Tax Deed was issued by the Auditor of 
Uintah County, Utah, to Uintah County, covering the lands 
in question, dated April 15th, 1938, recorded May; 9th, 1938, 
in Book 31 of Deeds, pages 426-427 of the records of Uintah 
County, Utah (page 33). 
4. Uintah County sold the subject lands to Burns Hallet 
on September 30th, 1940, as shown by commissioners min-
utes and an "Agreement for Salt of Real Property" shown 
at pages 34-36. 
5. Uintah County conveyed its interest in the property 
to Burns Hallet on September 22nd, 1943, by Tax Deed re-
corded September 28th, 1943, in Book "34" of Deeds, page 
54, of the records of Uintah County, Utah (page 37). 
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6. Burns Hallet and wife conveyed this property to J. 
Parry Bowen by Quit Claim Deed dated December 20th, 
1945, recorded January 15th, 1946, in Book "35" of Deeds, 
page 263 of the records of Uintah County, Utah (page 38). 
7. J. Parry Bowen, also known as J. Perry Bowen, also 
known as J. P. Bowen, and his wife, conveyed to J. A. 
Cheney an undivided one half interest in and to all of the 
oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be 
produced from the lands involved in this action and other 
lands, by Mineral Deed acknowledged August 19th, 1946, 
recorded August 21, 1946, in Book "10" of Miscellaneous, 
pages 332-333, of the records of Uintah County, Utah (pages 
41-42). 
8. J. A. Cheney and wife conveyed one-eighth interest 
in and to all oil, gas and other minerals, in and under, and 
that may be produced from the subject lands, to J. R. Rob-
ertson, by Mineral Deed dated June 14th, 1948, recorded 
July 14th, 1948, in Book "13" of Miscellaneous, page 122 of 
the records of Uintah County, Utah (page 43). 
9. A Royalty Contract was made by J. A. Cheney and 
Jennie L. Cheney, his wife to Guy T. Woodworth, conveying 
an undivided one-fourth interest in and to all of the oil, gas 
and other minerals in and under and that may be produced 
from the subject lands, and dated July 26th, 1947, recorded 
July 28th, 1947, in Book "12" of Miscellaneous, pages 210-
211 {pages 46-47). 
10. A Quit Claim Deed was given by J. Parry Bowen 
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and wife to Keith J. Bowen, dated April 26th, 1947, record-
ed May 15th, 1947, in Book "36" of Deeds, page 338, as 
Entry No. 30095, covering the lands involved in this action 
(page 55). 
11. A WarrantyDeed was executed by Keith J. Bowen 
and wife, to Morley Dean and Irene M. Dean as joint tenants 
and not as tenants in common with full right of survivorship, 
dated May 8th, 1947, recorded May 15th, 1947, in Book 
"36" of Deeds, page 338, Entry No. 30096, in which the 
grantor reserves all of the minerals, oils and gases upon, in 
or under the said lands (page 56) . 
12. Assessment and payment of taxes for the period 
from 1940 to 1946 inclusive, and for the year 1949 are 
shown at page 59. 
13. A preliminary tax sale was made for taxes delin-
quent for the year 1947, and subsequent delinquent taxes 
for the year 1948, which is undated. There is no record of 
the filing of this tax sale record in the abstract (page 60). 
14. Redemption Certificate dated December 30th, 1949, 
showing redemption of the tax sale shown at item 13 (page 
61,) by "J. Perry Bowen by Morley Dean." 
15. Oil and Gas Lease from Keith J. Bowen and Norma 
H. Bowen, his wife, to Phillips Petroleum Company, dated 
December 8th, 1945, recorded May 13th, 1946, in Book "9" 
of Miscellaneous, pages 573-78, Entry No. 26474 (pages 
39-40). 
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16. Oil and Gas Lease from J. Parry Bowen, et al., to 
Phillips Petroleum Company, dated November 20th, 1946, 
recorded December 9th, 1946, in Book "11" of Miscellaneous 
pages 495-9, Entry No. 28639 (pages 53-54). 
There are other conveyances in the abstract which 
occurred subsequent to the filing of the action which do not 
affect this proceeding. 
In his Memorandum Decision, the trial judge gives his 
opinion and decision as to the facts of adverse possession 
and the payment of taxes (Rec. 63-86). The facts on ad-
verse possession and the payment of taxes are accepted by 
the plaintiffs and cross-defendants except in minor details, 
but object to the legal effect of such facts. 
At page 76 of the record, said Memorandum Decision 
reads: 
"It is therefore held that the possession of Hallet, 
Bowen and Dean, in succession for the full seven 
years was open and notorious within the require-
ments of the law. Thus, unless the plaintiffs have 
failed to pay all taxes levied and assessed during 
the adverse period, and unless such failure if any, 
results in an interruption of the adverse possess-
ion, the Court will have to hold plaintiffs' possess-
ion adequate to entitle plaintiffs to judgment." 
(Emphasis appellants) 
"The latter question with respect to plaintiffs' 
payment of the taxes assessed against the subject 
land for the full required seven years of adversity, 
is raised by the defendant and reserved in the 
Pre-Trial Order." 
* * * * * 
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"The record shows that no taxes were assessed 
against the subject lands in 1940 or 1941. It shows 
that each year thereafter to and including the 
year 1946, all taxes were promptly paid. In 1947, 
however, assessment was properly made in the 
name of J. Parry Bowen, as owner, the apparent 
title following the Burns Hallet purchase being in 
him. Those taxes were not paid in 1947 and the 
property was sold to Uintah County. The 1948 
taxes assessed against the property were not paid 
at due date and the amount of the taxes, interest, 
penalties and costs were added to the 1947 certi-
fication. On December 30, 1949, all delinquent 
taxes, interest, penalties and costs were paid by 
'J. Parry Bowen by Morley Dean,' (the latter hav-
ing succeeded to the County's rights on May 8, 
194 7,) and a Redemption Certificate was issued. 
Payment of such taxes is mandatory if an adverse 
claimant is to obtain title." (Emphasis ours.) 
* * * :)(< * 
"Thus it is clear that unless this Redemption is a 
payment of 'taxes which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law,' the 
adverse claimants, plaintiffs, have failed to estab-
lish their title by adverse possession." (Rec. 77) 
Continuing on page 81 the Memorandum Decision 
states: 
"1947 and 1948 taxes were not paid. This action 
began by the filing of the Complaint on Septem-
ber 22, 1948, and the redemption of the two de-
linquent years' taxes did not occur until December 
30, 1949, a year, three months and eight days after 
the action began. Thus, on the date the action 
began the plaintiff's predecessor in interest had 
paid taxes for only six, and not seven consecutive, 
'continuous,' years as required by the statute." 
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On page 84 of the record, in his Memorandum Decision, 
the Lower Court after having discussed the status of the 
defendant, Olson, as being barred by the provisions of Sec-
tion 104-2-7, U. C. A. 1943 (now 78-12-7 U. C. A. 1953) 
makes the following comment: 
"But because he is the title holder, and because his 
possession is presumed in the law, whenever the 
adverser either fails to maintain his possession in 
all of its elements, or whenever he fails to pay any 
taxes lawfully levied and assessed against the 
land, by such failure he changes his status from an 
adverser to that of a mere trespasser, the con-
structive possession of the legal title holder attach-
es, and the adverser, if he is to acquire title, must 
build from that point forward his seven years of 
adversity and payment of taxes." 
At pages 84 and 85 of the record, the Memorandum 
Decision states: 
"The situation of the facts and law of the instant 
case might well induce the same expression as the 
court uses on page 545 of the Utah Report (Keller 
vs. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318) : 'There 
are no equities on appellants' (defendant's) side of 
this case. It tends to offend one's sense of justice. 
x x we are x x forced to adhere to the cases so 
far decided on the strict rule.' " 
In concluding his Memorandum Decision, the Lower 
Court states on page 85 of the record: 
"It is thus ordered that judgment enter in favor 
of the defendant Culbert L. Olson upon plaintiffs' 
Complaint, No Cause of Action, and that the de-
fendant Culbert L. Olson have judgment in his 
10 
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favor and against the plaintiffs and each and all 
thereof upon his counterclaim and cross com-
plaint." 
After the filing of the Memorandum Decision above 
quoted, the plaintiffs made their "Motion to Reopen" found 
on pages 91 to 94 of the record. This motion was based 
upon Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It went to the 
effect that there was no evidence before the court and no 
presumption could be raised that the taxes for the year 
1947 were assessed upon said land according to law as re-
quired by Section 104-2-12 U. C. A. 1943 (now 78-12-12 U. 
C. A. 1953) to support the finding of the Lower Court that 
the plaintiff failed to pay all of the taxes which had been 
legally assessed upon the said land described in the plaintiffs' 
Complaint on file in the action. The affidavit suporting said 
motion was made for the purpose of showing "That the 
taxes for the year 1947, in Uintah County, State of Utah, 
were not assessed according to law." (Rec. 91-94.) 
The motion was denied (Rec. 95-96) as follows: 
"The Court thus holds plaintiff to be in error in 
his contention that the title holder has the burden 
of proving that any tax assessed but unpaid during 
the adverse period was assessed 'according to law,' 
but to the contrary, holds that the adverser has 
the burden of proving that he paid all seven years 
taxes, or that there were no taxes assessed in any 
year in which he failed to pay taxes, or that any 
years taxes assessed which he did not pay were 
not 'lawfully assessed.' " (Emphasis ours.) 
It is to be noted here that the Lower Court had already 
11 
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found in his Memorandum Decision at page 15 (Rec. 77) 
that the plaintiffs had paid the taxes. 
The Lower Court wrote and filed his own findings, 
conclusions and decree (Rec. 97-107). Conclusion of Law 
No. 4 (Rec. 103) reads: 
"That defendant Culbert L. Olson is entitled to 
have the decree of this Court made and entered 
herein awarding him judgment against the plain-
tiffs' Complaint, and in his favor upon his Counter-
claim, quieting title in him, in and to the real pro-
perty described in paragraph 1 of the Findings of 
Fact above." (Emphasis ours.) 
Plaintiffs and cross-defendants then made a "MOTION 
TO REOPEN" supported by affidavit (Rec. 108-112), and a 
''MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" supported by affidavit (Rec. 
113-117) which were filed April lOth, 1953. The first mo-
tiion was based upon rule 60 (b) (1) and (7) that through 
mistake, inadvertance, surprise and excusable neglect, the 
plaintiffs should be allowed to present evidence on the as-
sessment for 1947 which was not made according to law in 
order that substantial justice might be done according to 
the Lower Court's statement at the bottom of page 84 and 
the top of page 85 of the record. The second motion was 
based upon Rule 52 (b) and Rule 59 (a) (4), (6) and (7), 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for substantially the 
same reasons. 
The Lower Court entered his "ORDER OVERRULING 
MOTIONS" on May 26th, 1953, as shown at page 120 of the 
record. 
12 
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The following facts are stated for the purpose of show-
ing the inception of adverse possession: 
Burns Hallett bought the property from Uintah County 
/ 
on September 30th, 1940 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 34-36). 
He immediately went upon it and ascertained the boundaries 
(Tr. 26). He made an arrangement with the Indian Depart-
ment for exchange use of grazing on March 20th, 1941, or 
thereabouts (Tr. 36, Tr. 188). Prior to that date, Hallett 
had been using Indian lands and the Indians had been using 
his lands (Tr. 37, Tr. 195). The arrangement for grazing 
was made as the result of the respective use by the other 
of the lands involved (Tr. 37, Tr. 197). John K. Arnold 
knew of Burns Hallett's claim of ownership in 1940 (Tr. 
124). William H. Arnold knew of his ownership in 1940 
or 1941 (Tr. 161). 
As to the facts barring defendant and cross-complain-
ant by limitations and laches on the part of the said defend-
ant, the following are stated: 
Culbert L. Olson went to California in 1921 (Tr. 4). In 
his testimony from pages 3 to 22 of the transcript, he is very 
vague on his recollection of the events from the time he quit 
paying taxes in 1933 up to the present time. In his letters 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits F, Hand I) he first says "I do not know 
at this time what interest I have in the land in Uintah 
County'' and then tries to show that he had leases on the 
property under which the present adversers agreed to pay 
the taxes and then didn't. He repudiates the facts stated 
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in the letters in his testimony (Tr. 16 et. seq.). He did not, 
during that time, personally supervise the property and left 
it up entirely to Clarence I. Johnson (Tr. 11, 12) who was 
supposedly his agent but whom he did not mention in his 
said letters. His only knowledge of Ercel Johnson was told 
to him by Clarence I. Johnson in 1946 (Tr. 12). He couldn't 
find any files or records to ascertain what lands he owned 
in Uintah County and any leases which he could have made 
on them (Tr. 16, 17, 240). He had no record of any corres-
pondence concerning this land (Tr. 12). His only contact 
with this land between 1933 and March, 1950, was a con-
versation had with Clarence I. Johnson in Los Angeles in 
1946 (Tr. 11-12, Tr. 241-242, Tr. 251). He testified "that 
from 1934 on, * * * until 1943, and past, I was so occupied 
in public life that these matters were neglected by me to 
make injuiry into" (Tr. 10). The abstract of title (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit J, page 39-40, 43-54) shows two oil and gas 
leases were executed on this land in 1945 and 1946. This 
abstract was forwarded to the defendant and received by 
him on December 19th, 1949 (Tr. 241). He was told by 
Mr. Stanley in a telephone conversation on December 7th, 
1949, that there was an oil well drilling in the vicinity 
"about nine miles away." (Tr. 260). 
Boyd Winn, defendant's witness, never heard of Culbert 
L. Olson until a few days before the first trial in 1950 (Tr. 
207). He never heard of any claim of Culbert L. Olson 
being the owner of said land (Tr. 211) although he had re-
sided right next to it since 1943. 
14 
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POINTS 
I. 
APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT ADVERSE POSS-
ESSION COMMENCED ON SEPTEMBER 30th, 1940, AND 
WAS ESTABLISHED SEPTEMBER 30th, 1947. 
II. 
REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948 TAXES ON 
DECEMBER 30th, 1949 HAD THE SAME EFFECT AS 
IF THE TAXES WERE PAID BEFORE DLINQUENCY. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
THE MOTIONS TO REOPEN AND THE MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL. 
IV. 
APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED A 
DECREE QUIETING THEIR TITLE AS CROSS-DEFEND-
i· ANTS ON THEIR ANSWER TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT 
OF RESPONDENT, AND AS PLAINTIFFS ON THEIR 
ANSWER TO THE COUNTER-CLAIM IN THE AMEND-
:t 
ED ANSWER OF TTHE DEFENDANT. 
A. APPELLANTS PAID ALL TAXES ASSESSED 
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CROSS-COMPLAINT 
AND PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COUNTER-CLAIM 
IN THE AMENDED ANSWER. 
B. THE REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948 
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TAXES ON DECEMBER 30, 1949, WAS THE PAYMENT 
OF TTAXES UNDER SECTION 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953. 
C. AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-
COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAIN-
ANT, PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS CAN 
RELY UPON THE REDEMPTION AND PAYMENT OF 
TAXES ON DECEMBER 30th, 1949. 
v. 
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT OLSON 
IS BARRED BY LACHES FROM ASSERTING HIS ANS-
WER, CROSS-COMPLAINTS AND COUNTER-CLAIM. 
VI. 
THE LOWER COURT MADE SOME MINOR ERRORS 
IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECREE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT ADVERSE POSS-
ESSION COMEENCED ON SEPTEMBER 20th, 1940, AND 
WAS ESTABLISHED SEPTEMBER 30th, 1947. 
The appellants took the position in the court below, that 
their adverse possession commenced on September 30th, 
1940. Uintah County had received title by Auditor's Tax 
Deed on April 15th, 1938 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 39). 
On September 30th, 1940, the County Commissioners sold 
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the property to Burns Hollett (the court finding in Finding 
5, Rec. 98-99 that this is the same person as Burns Hallett) 
as shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 34, 35 and 36. The 
Indian Department had been grazing these lands for many 
years before this time (Tr. 194-198), and continued so to 
graze the lands involved in this action (Tr. 195) in the per-
iod commencing November 15th, 1950, and ending May 1st, 
1941. About March 20th or 21st, 1941, the Indian Depart-
ment came up to "see about trespassing my cattle" as testi-
fied by Burns Hallett (Tr. 37). Prior to that date, Hallett 
had been using the Indian "School lands" near his other 
lands in Section 13, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Uintah 
Special Meridian (Tr. 34, 35,) for the grazing of about 30 
head of cattle (Tr. 46). An arrangement was made that 
the Indian Department would use the lands in controversy 
here during their grazing period from November 15th, each 
year to the following May 1st, and that Burns Hallett would 
use the Indian "School lands" in the spring, summer and 
fall (Tr. 41). The Memorandum Decision (Rec. 68-70) 
held: 
''Burns Hallett, however, did not graze any cattle 
upon the grounds in question, nor did he ever go 
back to ascertain the success or failure of his ditch 
construction. Rather, in the winter of 1940 and 
the spring of 1941, he turned his stock upon the 
range at his lower place, and allowed them to run 
upon Indian lands. The Indians habitually grazed 
their lands in the fall, through the winter and into 
late spring, and the ground in question was suit-
able for grazing at that season. About March 20th 
or 21st of 1941, Burns Hallett met with Joe A. 
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Wagner and Ralph J. Richards, agents for the 
Indian Service and the agents made some com-
plaint to Hallett about the latter's cattle being 
allowed to range upon Indian lands. Burns Hallett 
told the agents of his claimed ownership of the 
lands in question and suggested that the Indian 
Department and he exchange grazing, he to be 
allowed to turn his stock loose upon Indian lands 
in the late spring and summer and early fall 
months and the Department to graze the lands 
belonging to Hallett, including the questioned lands, 
during the late fall, winter and early spring." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
* * * * * 
"During all this period, 'Indian cattle ranged on 
the lands in question 'every fall, winter, and early 
spring,' and this grazing exhausted the utility of 
the land." 
Appellants agree with the trial court on the facts set 
forth above, but object to the carrying forward of these facts 
into finding 9 of the Findings of Fact (Rec. 4) in the follow-
ing quoted particulars: 
"during the summer of 1951" (line2 of finding 9). 
"And that thereafter" (lines 9 and 10, finding 9). 
Examining the Lower Court's Memorandum Decision as 
above quoted, the excerpts from the Findings of Fact above 
noted should read: 
"On March 20th or 21st, 1951." 
"and that beginning with the winter of 1940." 
As to that part of finding 6 (Rec. 99) which read as 
follows: 
''That aside from locating the boundary lines on 
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.. .,: 
the said real estate, the said Burns Hallett did no 
act whatsoever to take possession under his con-
tract of purchase or to indicate to any person who 
may have been interested in such land that he was 
by such act taking or asserting actual possession 
thereof under or by virtue of his contract above 
referred to in paragraph 5." 
Such finding is entirely in error, is contrary to the 
evidence as set forth in the Memorandum Decision above 
quoted, and also at variance with findings 7 and 9. 
As to all other findings of the court from 1 to 9, the 
appellants are in harmony. 
What appellants do contend under this heading aside 
from the few errors made by the lower court in his findings 
6 and 9, is that the trial court failed to include in his findings 
the possession of Morley Dean set forth at page 71 of the 
record, and to carry into such findings his finding in his 
Memorandum Decision as shown at page 76 of the record: 
"It is therefore held that the possession of Hallett, 
Bowen and Dean, in succession for the full seven 
years was open and notorious within the require-
ments of the law. Thus, unless the plaintiffs have 
failed to pay all taxes levied and assessed during 
the adverse period, * * * the Court will have to 
hold plaintiffs' possession adequate to entitle plain-
tiffs to judgment." 
In the case of Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 
P.2d 239, the facts show that the county first leased the 
property in question to a tenant, then sold under a contract 
as in the present case, and then later conveyed by deed. 
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This Supreme Court ruled that the defendant, Slechta, could 
tack on the possession of the tenant and the contract holder. 
The position of Burns Hallett under his contract of sale 
would be the same as that of a tenant, and the giving of that 
contract would be an act of the county in asserting possess-
ion in itself. 
''The fact that there were defects in the proceedings 
did not change the nature of the county's claim. 
It was open, hostile and adverse to the record own-
er's right." 
At pages 66 and 67 of the record, the Lower Court in 
his Memorandum Decision, reasons on pages 4 and 5 of such 
decision that the adverse possession of the plaintiffs and 
their predecessors in interest did not begin until June 30th, 
1941, when Burns Hallett cleaned out a ditch and brought 
irrigation water onto the subject lands. The said decision 
went to the effect that the prior grazing agreement between 
Hallett and the Indian Agency and their respective uses 
during the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941, were not 
adverse acts. These findings were carried forward into 
findings 7 and 9 of the findings of fact (Rec. 98-99) and 
into conclusion 3 of the Conclusions of Law (Rec. 102). 
This is on the basis that the adverser must himself do some 
adverse act in order to start adverse possession by using the 
property personally. 
In the case of Kellogg v. Huffman, 30 P.2d 593, the ad-
verser did not go upon the ground except to make a lease. 
In that case, the lessees had been in actual possession and 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~~ had used the property for many years prior to the purchase 
l1: by the adverser, just as the Indian Department had been 
using the lands in the present case for many years prior to 
r:, the purchase by Burns Hallett. In that case, there was no 
h change in the use of the land thereafter and no notification 
given to anyone except the lessees that the adverser was 
taking posession and leasing the property to the tenants, 
and the opinion reads: 
"The appellants virtually concede that the use 
thus made of this land during these years would 
have been sufficient to establish a title by adverse 
possession had this use been by the respondents 
personally or by any tenant other than the Bour-
dieu brothers. But they argue that the Bourdieu 
brothers, prior to their recognizing and renting 
from the respondents, had for some years pastured 
this land in connection with other lands used by 
them without the permission of any one and under 
no claim of right; that after the issuance of the 
tax deed they continued to use the land in the 
same manner as before; and that their use of the 
land as tenants of the respondents could not inure 
to the benefit of the respondents until notice of 
a change in the manner of occupation and use was 
brought home to the appellants. They rely on a 
line of cases in which it has been held that a poss-
ession and use which has been entered into with 
the consent of the owner cannot become adverse 
to such owner without some notice of a canged 
intention. While the rule just referred to has its 
proper application in some cases, it neither applies 
nor controls under the circumstances here appear-
ing. It may first be observed that such use of 
this land as was made by these tenants prior to 
the time they leased the same from the respond-
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ents, was neither with the knowledge or consent 
of the appellants. During those years they simply 
allowed their sheep to roam over the land without 
claim of right. A somewhat similar contention 
was considered in the case of Holtzman v. Douglas, 
168 U. S. 278, 18 S. Ct. 65, 66, 42 L. Ed. 466. In 
that case the court said: 'The doctrine which the 
plaintiff seeks to set up, we think is not applicable 
to the facts of this case. After the puchase at the 
tax sale, the delivery of the deed, and the record-
ing thereof, Mrs. Douglas, in 1867, claimed title 
to the land, and demanded possession thereof from 
Rothwell, and by reason of the understanding then 
arrived at between herself and Rothwell he became 
the tenant of Mrs. Douglas as the representative 
of the heirs at law of William Douglas, and such 
tenancy continued up to the commencement of 
this action. She went to him under a claim of 
ownership and of the right to immediate possession 
of the lot as owner. He then acknowledged her 
right, became her tenant, and paid rent to her. 
That certainly placed Mrs. Douglas, as the repre-
sentative of the heirs, in possession of the lot. 
From that time the facts are sufficient upon which 
to base a claim of adverse possession. We think 
it was inaugurated when Rothwell, under his agree-
ment with Mrs. Douglas, acknowledged her right, 
and paid her rent; and it was immaterial so far 
as the heirs are concerned, that Rothwell had be-
fore that time entered upon the lot, although un-
der no claim of title, and presumably in subordin-
ation of the title of plaintiff's predecessors. Har-
vey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 328 (17 L. Ed. 
871). If Rothwell were himself asserting a title 
by adverse possession, while coming into possess-
ion by acknowledgement of and under the title of 
the owners, there might be an opportunity for 
the application of the doctrine contended for by 
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plaintiff, and in such case Rothwell could not set 
up title by adverse possession while entering in 
subordination to the title of the owner, unless he 
first vacated, and then retook possession as a hos-
tile entry, or did some act necessarily evincing an 
intention to put an end to his tenancy. We are 
not dealing with Rothwell's rights or title. The 
defendants did all they were called upon to do in 
order to take possession and inaugurate an ad-
verse holding, when they came with their tax 
deed, claimed to own the property described in it, 
and exercised an act of ownership by letting the 
lot to Rothwell as a tenant at a certain rent. When 
Rothwell recognized the claim of ownership, and 
remained in possession from that time in subor-
dination to the rights of Mrs. Douglas and the 
heirs at law, their adverse possession, so far as 
this point is concerned, was sufficiently inaugur-
ated. Mrs. Douglas was no party or privy to the 
prior entry of Rothwell, and therefore, whatever 
the circumstances as proven in this case regard-
ing such prior entry, her rights and those of the 
heirs cannot be in any way affected thereby. There 
is no pretense of any fraud or concealment in the 
case by any one; certainly not by Mrs. Douglas. 
Neither she nor the heirs were bound, in order 
to maintain their rights, to give any written or 
verbal notice to the former owners that they were 
in possession through Rothwell; nor did the poss-
ession of Rothwell, as tenant of the Douglas heirs, 
fail to commence at the time of this agreement 
because he did not give notice to the former own-
ers of his recognition of the title and right to the 
possession as claimed by Mrs. Douglass.' '' 
Appellants contend that under the rulings of the Boz-
ievich v. Slecta case, supra, and the case of Kellogg v. Huff-
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man, supra, that the adverse possession actually commenc-
ed on September 30th, 1940, and under the facts found on 
page 76 of the Memorandum Decision, continued until the 
trial. Burns Hallett received full rental for the use by the 
Indians of his lands during the fall, winter and spring of 
1940 and 1941, by being allowed to graze the Indian lands 
during the spring, summer and fall of 1941, and the under-
standing of March 20th, 1941, was a confirmation of the 
use that each had of the other's property prior to that date. 
As to the payment of taxes during such period or the 
non-assessment of such taxes, the Lower Court found in 
finding 11 (Rec. 101) that no taxes were assessed in 1941, 
and that in 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946, the taxes were 
promptly paid by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in 
interest. On page 14 of his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 
76), the Lower Court found that no taxes were assessed for 
the year 1940. The record shows that no taxes were assess-
ed for the years 1940 and 1941, and that they were promptly 
paid by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title for the 
years 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946, or a total of seven 
years successively. 
Plaintiffs and appellants therefore take the stand that 
adverse possession began on September 30th, 1940, that it 
had ripened before the 1947 taxes became delinquent on 
November 30th, 1947, and that the payment of said taxes 
were not necessary to obtain the decree quieting their title. 
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II. 
REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948 TAXES ON 
DECEMBER 30th, 1949 HAD THE SAME EFFECT AS IF 
THE TAXES WERE PAID BEFORE DELINQUENCY. 
The appellants were not deprived of their title by any 
tax sale prior to the filing of their complaint. The "PRE-
LIMINARY TAX SALE" which is used as a basis for de-
feating plaintiffs' adverse title is shown at page 60 of Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit J. There is no date shown on the sale. There 
is no proof in the record as to when it was made. It could 
in all probability have been made after the filing of the 
complaint on September 22, 1948. If the respondent is 
going to contend that redemption of taxes after the filing 
of the plaintiffs' complaint is not a payment of taxes be-
cause plaintiffs were divested by a tax sale, he must prove 
that there was a tax sale before the filing of such complaint. 
This he has not done. The respondent is under as much 
obligation in maintaining his title to pay taxes as the appell-
ants are in maintaining their title, and the county is the one 
who is protected by the statute requiring the payment of 
taxes as a condition precedent to the granting of a decree 
quieting title under adverse possession. 
In the case of Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509, 261 Pac. 
450, at the bottom of page 451 of the Pacific Reporter, it is 
said: 
"The owner of the property, within the period 
allowed for redemption! had redeemed the proper-
ty from that tax sale, and thereafter any right 
that the county had by reason of the levy and 
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the tax in the year 1917 was extinguished· to the 
same extent that its claim would have been had 
the taxes been paid prior to the delinquent tax sale 
of December 17, 1917. Such is the plain intent of 
the statute." Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, No. 6024." 
Said Section 6024 became Section 80-10-59, R. S. U. 
1933, Section 80-10-59, U. C. A. 1943, and is now Section 
59-10-56, U. C. A. 1953. The statute has been slightly 
amended to fit the new amendments to the tax laws but is 
substantially the same as the 1917 statute. 
Appellants paid the county and absolved the property 
from the tax lien. Respondent did not pay these taxes. 
Each having had an equal opportunity to pay the taxes, the 
respondent cannot now complain about the rulings above 
quoted, that the payment relates back and has the same 
effect as if the taxes were paid before delinquency. 
We think that this is further sanctioned by the rule 
laid down in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 255 P.2d 989, and 
goes further, as follows: 
"Such title acquired after action begun, but before 
defendant pleads adversely, may be . pleaded and 
proved in derogation of the defendant's adverse 
claim." (Citing Weiner v. Stearns, 1911, 40 Utah 
185, 120 P. 490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175.) 
The Answer of Culbert L. Olson (Rec. 7) is in no wise 
an adverse claim to the property involved in this action. 
His prayer that "his right, title and interest in any of the 
real property described in plaintiff's complaint be ascertain-
ed and determined" is an admission that he himself has 
not ascertained that he has any rights in the property and 
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certainly where several tracts are involved, his claim to be 
adverse to any one of them must at least be sufficient to 
show in particularity which piece of property he claims an 
interest in. It it can be conceded, which appellants do not 
admit, that the redemption of the 1947 taxes is "acquiring 
title", under the present facts and circumstances and under 
the above decision, the appellants have perfected that title by 
paying the taxes on December 30th, 1949. The said "Ans-
wer" does not state any facts which could constitute an ad-
verse claim against the property involved in this appeal. 
Ill. 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
THE MOTIONS TO REOPEN AND THE MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL. 
After the entry of the Memorandum Decision (Rec. 
63-86) showing that the plaintiffs' possession did not com-
mence to run until June 30th, 1941 (Rec. 67) and that it was 
necessary to pay the 1947 taxes before the commencement 
of the action to establish adverse possession under Section 
78-12-12, U. C. A. 1953, the appellants filed their "MOTION 
TO REOPEN" shown at pages 91 to 94 of the record. This 
motion was made under Rule 61 of Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, on the ground that it was necessary to reopen in 
order that substantial justice to the parties might be done. 
At pages 84 and 85 of the record, the Lower Court in 
his Memorandum Decision states: 
"Thus it must be held that when plaintiffs failed 
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to pay the seventh year's taxes, they being law-
fully assessed, their right of possession as advers-
ers of the title terminated, and the constructive 
possession of the owner attached, making plain-
tiffs mere trespassers. Keller vs. Chournos, supra." 
{102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318). 
* * * * * 
"The situation of the facts and law of the instant 
case might well induce the same expression as the 
court uses on page 545 of the Utah Report: 'There 
are no equities on appellants' {defendant's) side 
of this case. It tends to offend one's sense of jus-
tice, x x we are x x forced to adhere to the cases 
so far decided on the strict rule.' " 
If the Lower Court is relying on the cited case for auth-
ority to terminate the adverse possession by failure to pay 
taxes, when did defendant Olson pay any taxes? When did 
he start suit to quiet his title?. 
In reading the Keller vs. Chournos case, supra, we find 
at page 323 of the Pacific Reporter, the following: 
"The most that defendants Chournos could claim, 
under the record in this case, would be possession 
of the land adverse to the legal owner and pay-
ment of the taxes thereon for a period of about 
four years, from November 3, 1936, when they 
took possession under the County's deed, until 
plaintiff paid the general taxes for 1940 and in-
stituted this action October 25, 1940." 
The Trial Court held that Morley Dean paid the taxes 
by redeeming them on December 30, 1949, but that such a 
payment was not made before the commencement of the 
action, and that redemption was not a payment of taxes 
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under Section 78-12-12, U. C. A. 1953. 
From the Motion and Affidavit supporting it (Rec. 
91 to 94) it is stated that there was no evidence or presump-
tion that the taxes for the year 1947 were "assessed accord-
ing to law" as required by Section 78-12-12 supra. The 
supporting affidavit showed that the auditor's affidavits as 
required by Sections 80-7-9 and 80-8-7 U. C. A. 1943, were 
premature, and were dated May 5th, 1947 before the equili-
zation meetings or extension of taxes. 
To this Motion the court entered his "ORDER UPON 
MOTION TO RE-OPEN" shown at pages 95 and 96 of the 
recorq. He made his denial to re-open upon the fact that 
the appellants had not made the motion under Rule 60 (b) 
R. C. P. 10 U. C. A. 662. This rule is for relief from a 
judgment and no judgment having been entered, such sup-
position was premature artd not applicable. The Order 
further states: 
"The Court * * * * * holds that the adverser has 
the burden of proving that he paid all seven years 
taxes, or that there were no taxes assessed in any 
year in which he failed to pay taxes, or that any 
years taxes assessed which he did not pay were 
not 'lawfully assessed.' " (Emphasis ours.) 
THE PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS HAD 
PAID THE TAXES BY THEIR REDEMPTION OF DE-
CEMBER 30th, 1949 BEFORE THE FILING OF THE 
CROSS-COMPLAINT ON JANUARY 9th, 1950. As here-
tofore shown in Sorensen v. Bills, supra, this had the same 
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effect as if the taxes were paid before delinquent. The 
plaintiffs and cross-defendants were not trying to find an 
excuse for not paying taxes in making this motion insofar 
as it pertained to this cross-complaint and counter-claim of 
defendant and cross-complainant. The argument was that 
inasmuch as the defendant and cross-complainant Olson had 
made the claim that the redemption on December 30th, 
1949 was not the payment of taxes for 1947 because there 
was a valid tax sale, then it was the burden of the party 
claiming that the sale was a valid sale to allege and prove 
the validity of the 1947 sale. In other words, according to 
the argument of defendant and cross-complainant, there 
was a valid tax sale which divested plaintiffs and cross-de-
fendants of their adverse title, and that the redemption of 
the taxes on December 30th, 1949, was not the payment of 
taxes but a redemption from the sale. 
It is elementary in this state that one who relies upon 
the validity of a tax sale proceeding must allege and prove 
that "every essential step in the tax proceedings to divest 
the owner of title has been conducted according to law." 
Deseret Livestock Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401. 
While the question has never been raised in this state as 
far as appellants can find, it should be just as elementary 
that one who relies upon the validity of a tax sale to divest 
adverser of his adverse title and so to claim that a redemp-
tion of the tax sale is not the payment of taxes, the burden 
of proving the validity of the tax sale upon which he relies 
should fall squarely on the shoulders of the party asserting 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.... 
the validity of the tax sale. We again emphasize that had 
appellants failed to pay the taxes at all, and were trying to 
find an excuse for the non-payment, then the rule would 
have been as outlined in the "ORDER UPON MOTION TO 
RE-OPEN" (Rec. 91-94), and the burden of so proving 
would have been upon appellants. But this is not the case. 
After the entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree (Rec. 97-107), the plaintiffs filed a "Motion 
to Reopen" under Rule 60 (b) (1) and (7), and a "Motion 
for New Trial" under Rule 52 (b) and Rule 59 (a) ( 4), ( 6) 
and (7), (Rec. 108-117.) These motions went to the effect 
that the plaintiffs considered that their adverse possession 
had matured before the 1947 taxes were delinquent, and 
even though it was established after the 1947 taxes were 
delinquent, that it had matured before the commencement 
of the action, and that the redemption on December 29th, 
1949, was a payment of the taxes for that year. Further 
that the court found in his findings, conclusions and decree 
that the 1947 taxes were "assessed according to law" when 
there was no evidence before the court to substantiate such 
a finding. Plaintiffs offered to present proof, if the case 
were re-opened or a new trial granted, that the taxes for 
1947 were not "assessed according to law" as provided by 
Section 78-12-12 U. C. A. 1953. Affidavits showing that the 
Auditor's Affidavits required by law as above set forth were 
dated May 5th, 1947, and were premature, and therefore 
the taxes were not assessed according to law, were affixed 
to each of the Motions. 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Trial Court overruled the motions (Rec. 120). 
Appellants quote from the case of Telonis v. Staley, 
104 U. 537, 144 P.2d 513, at page 517: 
"When the auditor finally delivers the assessment 
roll to the treasurer, it is required to be correct 
and complete, and Sec. 80-8-7, R. S. U. 1933 (Sec. 
6006, C. L. U. 1917), requires the assessment roll 
as corrected to be verified by the auditor. The 
auditor must declare under oath that he has cor-
rected it and has made it conform to the require-
ments of the county board of equalization and the 
State Tax Commission, and that the respective 
sums due as taxes have been computed and that 
he has added up the column of valuations, taxes, 
and acreage as required by law. See Sec. 2606, 
R. S. U. 1898, and C. L. U. 1907. When the assess-
ment roll is thus delivered to the treasurer with 
the final auditor's affidavit of authentication, the 
auditor certifies the same as the tax roll to the 
treasurer and to the public that the assessment 
roll as the official tax roll is complete and correct. 
The aforesaid affidavit is one of the statutory 
functions of the county auditor, and such affidavit 
must be executed and properly attached. The pro-
perty owner is entitled to rely on such verification 
and the treasurer is bound thereby and he is re-
quired to proceed to issue the tax notices in accor-
dance therewith, and to collect the taxes based on 
the computations of the auditor. The final affi-
davit of the auditor thus becomes highly impor-
tant, and in the absence of any curative provision 
in the statutes for failure of the auditor to sub-
scribe to and attach such certificate of authentica-
tion in affidavit form, the requirement of the stat-
ute must be observed." 
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The above quoted case is upheld in Equitable Life & 
Casualty Ins. Co., v. Schoewe, 105 Utah 569, 144 P.2d 526; 
Tree v. White, 110 Utah 1033, 171 P.2d 398; Petterson v. 
Ogden City, Utah, 111 Utah 125, 176 P.2d 599; Jenkins v. 
Moran, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871, and Pender v. Jackson, 
et al., 260 P.2d 542. In the last case, this Supreme Court 
held: 
"Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513, 
517, held that the statutes requiring attachment 
of the auditor's affidavits to the assessment rolls, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 59-7-9 and 59-8-7, establish-
ed a substantive rule, designed for the protection 
of the taxpayer, and 'in the absence of any cura-
tive provision in the statutes for failure of the 
auditor to subscribe to -and attach such certificate 
of authentication in affidavit form, the require-
ment of the statute must be observed.'" (Emphasis 
ours.) 
Morley Dean and Irene Dean, plaintiffs and cross-de-
fendants, are just as much taxpayers as is Culbert L. Olson, 
defendant and cross-complainant, when taxes are assessed 
to them or their predecessors, and the rule in the last quoted 
case should apply just as much to the adverser as to the 
original owner. What is sauce for the goose should be 
sauce for the gander. 
In the said Telonis case, supra, this Supreme Court 
granted a new trial although there is nothing in the decis-
ions in either Telonis case to show that a new trial was 
asked for. 
In view of the fact that the court made the statement 
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in his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 84-85) that his decision 
"tends to offend one's sense of justice," his rulings denying 
the motions to reopen and for a new trial appear to the 
appellants to be arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. Ap-
pellants should have been allowed to present proof that the 
1947 taxes were not "levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law" as required by Section 104-2-12, U. C. A. 
1943, as carried forward into Section 78-12-12, U. C. A. 
1953. In such event, the plaintiffs would have shown the 
invalidity of the 1947 sale, and should have recovered on 
their complaint under the lower court's ruling that they 
had more than seven years adverse possession (Rec. 76). 
IV. 
APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED A 
DECREE QUIETING THEIR TITLE AS CROSS-DEFEND-
ANTS ON THEIR ANSWER TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT 
OF RESPONDENT, AND AS PLAINTIFFS ON THEIR 
ANSWER TO THE COUNTER-CLAIM IN THE AMEND-
ED ANSWER OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Granting for argument, but not conceding, that the 
lower court was right in holding that plaintiffs did not pay 
the taxes for 1947 before they were delinquent, and that 
this seventh year of taxes were required to be paid before 
the commencement of the action, and therefore could not 
recover under the complaint, yet the cross-defendants in 
the various cross-complaints, and the plaintiffs under their 
answer to the counter-claim of defendant Olson in his Amen-
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ded Answer, should have been given a decree quieting their 
title for the following reasons: 
A. 
APPELLANTS PAID ALL TAXES ASSESSED PRIOR 
TO THE FILING OF THE CROSS-COMPLAINT AND 
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COUNTER-CLAIM IN 
THE AMENDED ANSWER. 
Appellant Morley Dean redeemed the 1947 and 1948 
taxes, and paid the 1949 taxes on December 30th, 1949 
(Rec. 81; Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, pages 59 and 61; Tr. 100). 
There is no dispute about this. 
Culbert L. Olson, Cross-Complainant, filed his Cross 
Complaint on January 9th, 1950 (Rec. 17-20). He contin-
ued to file various cross-complaints until his "CROSS-COM-
PLAINT of Defendant CULBERT L. OLSON", Amending 
and Replacing His Third Amended Cross-Complaint (Rec. 
43-50). In his "AMENDED ANSWER OF CULBERT L. 
OLSON" (Rec. 12-14), the defendant Olson makes his first 
counter-claim, and in fact his first answer, alleging in para-
graph III on page 2: 
"Further answering, this defendant affirmatively 
avers that he is the sole owner of said land and 
every part thereof in fee simple; that he is in poss-
ession of said land, and that the plaintiffs, or either 
or any of them have no right, title, estate or inter-
est in, to or upon said land or any part thereof." 
This Amended Answer was filed April 1st, 1950. It was 
the first Answer that alleged any interest in the particular 
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land involved in this appeal. In it, the defendant plead for 
a decree quieting his title. 
The plaintiffs and cross-defendants answered the var-
ious cross-complaints and the counter-claim in the Amended 
Answer by setting up a claim of adverse possession and the 
payment of taxes. The claim of adverse possession and the 
payment of taxes was not made by plaintiffs and cross-
defendants until after they had paid all taxes which had 
been levied and assessed prior to the interposition of the 
various cross-complaints and amended answer containing 
the counter-claim. 
B. 
THE REDEMPTION OF THE 1947 AND 1948 TAXES 
ON DECEMBER 30, 1949, WAS THE PAYMENT OF TAX-
ES UNDER SECTION 78-12-12 U. C. A. 1953. 
The Lower Court held in Conclusion of Law No. 2 
(Rec. 102) that plaintiffs could not recover on their com-
plaint for the reason that adverse possession did not begin 
to run until June 30, 1941, and the plaintiffs had not paid 
the taxes for the year 1947, which was the seventh year, 
until after the filing of the complaint. Granting for the 
sake of argument, that he was right in so doing, the claim 
that redemption is not the payment of taxes does not go 
to the original complaint, but applies only to the effect of 
such redemption made prior to the filing of the cross-com-
plaints and counter-claim. 
The record is very clear that the plaintiffs and cross-
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<:. 
Ut'. defendants paid all of the taxes that were paid between 
June 30th, 1941, the time the court found adverse possess-
ion commenced, and January 9th, 1950, when the defend-
ant Olson filed his first cross-complaint. OLSON PAID NO 
TAXES DURING THIS PERIOD. 
The Lower Court in his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 
83) to support his holding under Section 104-2-12 U. C. A. 
1953), that the plaintiffs had not "shown that the land has 
been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously and that the party, his predecessors and grant-
ors have paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon such land according to law," relied upon the cases of 
Keller vs. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318, Jenkins 
vs. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871, Home Owners Loan 
Corporation vs. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160, and 
Smith vs. Nelson, 113 Utah 51, 197 P.2d, 132. In all of 
those cases, the pretended adverser did not pay all of the 
taxes during the period of adversity, or the record owner 
had either paid all of the taxes or paid taxes before the 
period of adverse possession had run. 
Our statute governing this situation, Section 78-12-12 
U. C. A. 1953 (formerly 104-2-12, U. C. A. 1943), does not 
require the continuous payment of taxes, but requires that 
the adverser and his predecessors "have paid all taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land according to 
law." 
It has already been determined in this state, that re-
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demption is the payment of taxes. By way of repitition to 
confirm this point, we again quote Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 
509, 261 Pac. 450, at the bottom of page 451, as follows: 
"The owner of the property, within the period 
allowed for redemption, had redeemed the pro-
perty from the tax sale, and thereafter any right 
that the county had by reason of the levy and 
the tax in the year 1917 was extinguished to the 
same extent that its claim would have been had 
the taxes been paid prior to the delinquent tax sale 
on December 17, 1917. Such is the plain intent of 
the statute." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, No. 6024. 
Section No. 6024 is virtually the same as Section 59-10-
56, U. C. A. 1953. 
Section 59-10-1 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly 80-10-1, U. C. 
A. 1943) provides: 
"Every tax has the effect of a judgment against 
the person, and every lien created by this title has 
the force and effect of an execution duly levied 
against all personal property of the delinquent. 
The judgment is not satisfied nor the lien removed 
until the taxes are paid or the property sold for 
the payment thereof." 
Section 59-10-3 (formerly Section 80-10-3, U. C. A. 
1943) provides: 
"Every tax upon real property is a lien against 
the property assessed; and every tax due upon 
improvements upon real estate assessed to others 
than the owner of the real estate is a lien upon 
the land and improvements; which several liens 
attach as of the 1st day of January of each year." 
In construing Section 80-10-32, R. S. U. 1933 (which 
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c:: 
by amendment became Section 80-10-32, U. C. A. 1943, and 
is now Section 59-10-33, U. C. A. 1953) in connection with 
the above quoted sections, this Supreme Court in Western 
Beverage Co., of Provo, Utah v. Hansen, 98 Utah 332, 96 
P.2d 1105, said: 
" 'Sale' and 'sold', as herein used, do not refer to 
such sale as extinguishes the title of the owner and 
initiate a new title in the purchaser, either county 
or otherwise, so as to extinguish the right to re-
deem, nor prevent revesting of title in the owner 
upon redemption or the assignee lienholder, upon 
expiration of the redemption period when assign-
ment of certificate of tax sale has been made to 
the recorded lien holder." 
Most assuredly, under the 1939 amendment, Section 
80-10-32, U. C. A. 1943 and the present statute Section 
59-10-33, U. C. A., "sale" and "sell" could not be held to 
divest the delinquent tax payer of his title, as the sale is 
a ''PRELIMINARY SALE.'' 
If then, the redemption puts the owner back in the 
same position as if he had paid the taxes before sale, then 
the redemption is the payment of the taxes, and no injury 
to the owner's rights results from the delinquency. 
Attention is also invited to Section 59-10-64 ( 4), U. C. 
A. 1953 (formerly Section 80-10-68 (4) U. C. A. 1943), 
which provides that the county must sell the property on 
bid at the Auditor's Sale to the person bidding the taxes, 
penalties, interests and costs who offers said sum for the 
least amount of property, and states in part: 
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"In the event the bid accepted is for less than the 
entire parcel, the auditor shall note the fact, with 
a description of the property covered by the bid, 
upon the tax sale record and the balance of the 
parcel not affected by said bid shall be deemed to 
have been redeemed by the owner thereof." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
The statute still considers that the delinquent is the 
"owner" of the title. No re-conveyance or redemption of 
this property in the usual form is required. Surely there 
can be only one conclusion that prior to the Auditor's 
Certificate required by Section 59-10-64 (6) U. C. A. 1953, 
the county has no vested title in the property by reason 
of the preliminary sale, and that its lien is extinguished 
by the payment of the taxes either before delinquency, by 
redemption, or by a bid therefor for less than the entire 
tract. 
Under Section 59-10-56 U. C. A. 1953 and all prior 
statutes thereto, redemption may be made by the payment 
of taxes, penalty, interest and costs. The addition of the 
words "penalty, interest and costs" does not diminish the 
force of the "payment of taxes." 
The provisions of the statutes are for the benefit of 
the county and not for the benefit of the defendant and 
cross-complainant. As long as the county and the taxing 
districts are satisfied by the payment made by the taxpayer, 
the non-taxpayer Olson cannot show any prejudice. 
In Aggelos v. Zelia Mining Co., 99 Utah 417, 107 P.2d 
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170, reference is made to two California cases, namely Ows-
ley v. Matson, 156 Cal. 401, 104 P. 983; and Warden v. 
Bailey, 133 Cal. App. 383, 24 P.2d 192. In the case of Owsley 
v. Matson, supra, the court said: 
"But where, as in the present case, the tax has 
been allowed to become delinquent and a sale has 
taken place, and, so far as appears, while the 
party or his successor in interest was in undisturb-
ed possession, and all this is done in good faith, 
we see no reason why the same should not be held 
to operate as a payment, and we think it is suffic-
ient to bring the occupant within the terms of the 
statute which requires him to pay the taxes upon 
the property claimed.'' 
The lower court held that there was no question about 
the possession of Morley Dean after his purchase on May 
18th, 1947 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 56), as stated in 
the Memorandum Decision at page 71 of the Record: 
"There is no question of the use and occupancy of 
the property since the Dean purchase and possess-
ion." 
The redemption was made while Dean was in "undis-
puted possession." 
As to the "good faith" of Dean in allowing the taxes to 
go delinquent and redeeming them, the record clearly shows 
this "good faith." A decree quieting title to the property 
involved against the defendant and cross-claimant Olson, 
was recorded December 2nd, 1946 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, 
pages 51-52). He had received a Warranty Deed for the 
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property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J, page 56). He thought he 
had a marketable title, and any attorney in the area from 
an examination of his abstract would have given him an 
opinion to that effect. As a layman, he relied implicitly 
upon his Warranty Deed and did not think that he stood 
in the position of an adverser. He has continued in 
possession right up to the present time. During the poss-
ession, and before trial, he has caused the land to be irrigat-
ed, has fenced it, and has converted it from a barren sage-
brush covered place to a summer pasture in which he pas-
tures 60 head of cattle during the summer (Tr. 96). 
In his Memorandum Decision at page 22 thereof (Rec. 
84) the Lower Court says: 
"So long as the adverser maintains such possession 
and pays such taxes, the constructive possession 
of the owner stands suspended. But because he is 
the title holder, and because his possession is pre-
swned in the law, whenever the adverser either 
fails to maintain his possession in all of its ele-
ments, or whenever he fails to pay any taxes law-
fully levied and assessed against the land, by such 
failure he changes his status from an adverser to 
that of a mere trespasser, the constructive possess-
ion of the legal title holder attaches, and the ad-
verser, if he is to acquire title, must build from 
that point forward his seven years of adversity and 
payment of taxes." 
Paragraph 2 (Rec. 102) of the Conclusions of law 
reads: 
"That the said plaintiffs' intestate and his pre-
decessors in interest occupied such real property, 
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openly, exclusively, adversely, notoriously, contin-
uously and under claim of right from June 30, 
1941 until the 30th day of November, 1946, but 
lost their status as adversers and became mere 
trespassers following such date, because of failure 
to pay the taxes for the year 1947 as required by 
law." 
From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the 
r.: Lower Court intended that the last part of the foregoing 
sentence should have read "because of failure to pay the 
taxes for the year 1947 as required by law before they were 
delinquent.'' 
The Lower Court when this case was argued on the 
last motions made it clear that his stand was that if an 
adverse possessor paid his taxes regularly for six years and 
then let them go delinquent one year, that by such delin-
quency he would lose all of his adverse rights even though 
he redeemed the property from sale at a later date, and 
that he would have to start all over again. If he then held 
adversely for another six years, and let his seventh year's 
taxes go delinquent, his adverse possession would again 
cease and terminate, and again he would have to start over. 
This could go on for a hundred years and the adverser could 
never get adverse possession until he had paid seven years 
taxes each year successively before they were delinquent. 
Section 78-12-9 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly Section 104-2-9 
U. C. A. 1943) defines what constitutes adverse possession. 
There is no mention of the payment of taxes being a part 
( of adverse possession. 
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Section 78-12-12 U. C. A. (formerly Section 104-2-12 U. 
C. A. 1943) recites: 
"In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any section of 
this Code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes 
which have been levied and assessed upon such 
land according to law." (Emphasis ours.) 
This section provides two subdivisions for the establish-
ment of adverse possession, one being that the property be 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years contin-
uously, and the other is that the payment of taxes is a 
condition precedent to the granting of the decree. No 
statement is made as to when the taxes must be paid. No 
statement is made as to the length of time the taxes must 
have been paid. It has been held by this Supreme Court 
consistently that the intent of the statute is that seven 
years' taxes must be paid. 
It would seem to the writer that the provision for the 
payment of taxes has one of two purposes: First, to protect 
the owner from losing his property by adverse possession as 
long as he pays taxes; and second, to insure the payment of 
the taxes to the taxing units as a condition precedent to the 
granting of the decree quieting title. The defendant Olson 
did not protect himself by paying any taxes on the property 
for the years 1933 to 1949 inclusive. He made no attempt 
to do so. The taxing units have been fully paid by the plain-
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tiffs and their predecessors in interest from 1940 to 1949 
inclusive, for all taxes which have been levied whether they 
were assessed according to law or not. 
The Lower Court took this statute to mean that the 
taxes must be paid "as required by law" before the delin-
quent date each year consecutively. Appellants can read 
no such meaning into this statute. We have been unable 
to find any cases supporting the Lower Court's holding that 
delinquency in the payment of taxes results in the cessation 
of adverse possession even though the taxes are later re-
deemed by the adverser except in states which have a stat-
ute requiring such payment as does New Mexico as set forth 
in McGrail v. Fields, 203 P.2d, 1000. The Lower Court 
quoted this case in his Memorandum Decision as controlling. 
The statutes are entirely different. 
c. 
AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-
COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT OLSON, PLAINTIFFS 
AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS CAN RELY UPON THE 
REDEMPTION AND PAYMENT OF TAXES ON DECEM-
BER 30th, 1949. 
On page 15 of his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 77), 
it is held: 
"On December 30, 1949, all delinquent taxes, int-
erest, penalties and costs were paid by 'J. Parry 
Bowen by Morley Dean,' (the latter having suc-
ceeded to the County's Rights on May 8, 1947,) 
and a Redemption Certificate was issued. Pay-
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ment of such taxes is mandatory if an adverse 
claimant is to obtain title." 
As heretobefore shown in the next preceding subdivis-
ion of this brief, the redemption of the taxes on December 
30th, 1949, for the years 1947 and 1948, and the payment 
on said date of the 1949 taxes, constituted a payment of 
taxes within the meaning of the statute as set forth in 
Sorensen v. Bills, supra. As previously set forth, this re-
demption related back and had the same effect as if the 
taxes were paid before delinquent. However, even though 
this were not the case, the taxes were paid before the filing 
of the Cross-Complaint (Rec. 17-20) on January 9th, 1950, 
and the filing of the counter-claim (Rec. 12-14) on April 
21st, 1950. 
In Rowley v. Davis, 34 Cal. App. 184, 167 Pac. 162, 
the court said: 
"Referring to the record thus presented, appellant 
insists that the judgment should be reversed, be-
cause the action must be determined upon the 
facts as they existed at the time of the commence-
ment of the suit; 'Rowley not having pleaded any 
after-acquired title.' It is true that the plaintiff 
did not attempt to supplement his complaint by a 
statement showing title acquired after the action 
was commenced; also it is the law that he would 
not have a right to file a supplemental complaint 
showing after-acquired title, if in fact he had no 
title at the commencement of the action. Imperial 
Land Co. v. Imperial Irrigation District, 173 Cal. 
668, 161 Pac. 116, L. R. A. 1916D, 676, note. But 
the cross-complaint of the defendant Davis was 
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not filed until after plaintiff Rowle), had acquired 
the title of the defendant and cross-defendant Alice 
Huse. By filing that cross-complaint the cross-
complainant tendered new issues, whereby he set 
up a cause of action which relates to the date of 
filing the cross-omplaint. This he had the right 
to do. Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201, 208, 88 
Pac. 903, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818, 119 Am. St. Rep. 
181. The fact that Rowley had at that time ac-
quired the title of Mrs. Huse was available to him 
as a defense to the cross-action, and was provable 
under his claim of ownership as pleaded by his 
answer to the cross-complaint. If this were not 
so, a defendant by filing a cross-complaint would 
be able to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing an 
action which had been prematurely brought, and 
might thereby obtain 'on the merits' a judgment 
which possibly would permanently cut out the just 
rights of the plaintiff, by preventing him from 
thereafter litigating the title with the cross-com-
plainant. We therefore are of the opinion that 
the judgment should be sustained, if the evidence is 
sufficient to support Rowley's title as existing at 
the time of filing the cross-complaint." 
The above case is quoted with approval in Meagher v. 
Uintah Gas Co., supra, although in a manner not applicable 
here. 
Section 78-12-5 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly Section 104-2-5 
U. C. A. 1943) provides: 
"No action for the recovery of real property or 
for the possession thereof shall be maintained, un-
less it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, 
grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed of 
the property in question within seven years before 
the commencement of the action." 
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Section 78~12-6 U. C. A. 1953 (formerly Section 104-2-6 
r C. A. 1943) provides: 
"No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to 
an action, founded upon the title to real property 
or to rent or profits out of the same, shall be effec-
tual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting 
the action, or interposing the defense or counter-
claim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted 
or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancest-
or, predecessor or grantor of such person was 
seized or possessed of the property in question 
within seven years before the committing of the 
act in respect to which such action is prosecuted 
or defense or counterclaim made." (Emphasis 
ours). 
Applying this to the present action would make it read 
like this: 
"No counterclaim to an action, founded upon the 
title to real property or to rents or profits out of 
the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that 
the person interposing the counterclaim, or under 
whose title the counterclaim is made, or the an-
cestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was 
seized or possessed of the property in question 
within seven years before the committing of the 
act in respect to which such counterclaim is made." 
In other words, the statute runs up to the time of the 
interposing of the counterclaim, the act in the counterclaim 
being the claim of title and possession on the part of the 
defendant. 
The Amended Answer of Culbert L. Olson (Rec. 12-14), 
sets out his counterclaim in paragraph III as follows: 
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"Further answering, this defendant affirmatively 
avers that he is the sole owner of said land and 
every part thereof in fee simple; that he is in 
possession and is entitled to the possession of said 
land, and that the plaintiffs, or either or any of 
them have no right, title, estate or interest in, 
to or upon said land or any part thereof." 
This counterclaim was not interposed until April 21st, 
1950. 
The plaintiffs in the original complaint did not allege 
adverse possession or limitations. In their answer to the 
cross-claim in the amended answer (Rec. 15-16) plaintiffs 
set up adverse possession and the payment of taxes, in 
addition to the two above quoted limitation statutes as a 
defense to this counterclaim. 
The defendant Olson made no reply to the affirmative 
matter to the "Answer to Cross-Claim, in Amended Answer" 
(Rec. 15-1.6). 
The actual fact is that the case was tried upon the 
issue raised by the counterclaim in the amended answer, 
and the answer thereto setting up adverse possession and 
the payment of taxes, as well as limitations and laches. 
Judgment was to the effect that the plaintiffs could not 
recover on their complaint and that the defendant have 
judgment of no cause of action thereon. Judgment was 
given to Olson on his counterclaim by the Conclusion of 
Law 4 (Rec. 103). 
We invite the attention of this Supreme Court to the 
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discussion in the case of Weiner v. Stearnes, 40 Utah 185, 
120 Pac. 490. At page 497 of the Pacific Reporter it is said: 
Taking either horn of the delimma, therefore, we 
cannot see how Borg can successfully contend that 
the statute of limitations did not run against him. 
Counsel have not been able to find any case direct-
ly in point, and after a most diligent search we 
have been unable to do so. We are firmly con-
vinced, however, that, both in reason and upon 
principle, the appellant, under the undisputed facts, 
should prevail in this case. Our statute relating 
to adverse possession should be given a fair and 
reasonable application by the courts. In apply-
ing the statute, courts should aim to protect the 
substantial rights of all of the parties interested 
in the subject of action, and where the statutory 
time has fully elapsed, and the clain1ant in possess-
ion has complied with the provisions of the stat-
ute, the title to the property is vested in him, the 
same as though he had the most formal title deed. 
In this case the question is not one of dispute or 
conflicting facts. In our judgment, the tr:al court 
erred in his application of the law to the undis-
puted facts. Under such circumstances, we have 
quite as good an opportunity to determine the re-
sult as had the trial court. In our judgment, the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree are 
clearly against both the law and the evidence." 
While judgment was denied the plaintiffs on their com-
plaint, we think the ruling in Weiner v. Stearns, supra, 
applies with full impact to the counterclaim. Section 78-12-
6, U. C. A. segregates "defense or counterclaim", and in 
litigation based upon the counterclaim upon which judg-
ment is given, the statute is not tolled until the "interposi-
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tion" of the counterclaim. At the time of the "interposition" 
of the counterclaim in this case, the taxes had been fully 
paid by the plaintiffs up to and including the year 1949. 
While plaintiffs may not have been entitled to judgment on 
the complaint (which they do not admit), they are entitled 
to judgment on the counterclaim of the defendant. Rowley 
v. Davis, supra. 
In fact, the Lower Court on granting judgment on the 
counterclaim, awarded to plaintiffs judgment for the taxes 
paid on December 30th, 1949 (Rec. 106). If the Lower 
Court gives plaintiffs judgment for the payment of taxes, 
how can he in the same breath say that plaintiffs lost the 
action for failure to pay those very taxes? 
As to the defendant being barred by limitations, his 
testimony from pages 3 to 23 of the transcript clearly shows 
that he took no interest in this property at all from 1932 
to the late fall of 1949, when he was served with summons. 
He made no contacts with the property during that period. 
On September 19th, 1949, he wrote a letter in which he 
stated (Tr. 16; Plaintiffs' Exhibit F): 
"I do not know at this time what interest I still 
have in the land in Uintah County." 
Plaintiffs Exhibit H, dated December 22, 1949, a letter 
from defendant Olson, states: 
"Furthermore, I think I shall be able to prove 
that my agents were in possession before that date 
and all during the years of the tax delinquency 
under lease agreement to pay those taxes; that 
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they purposely permitted the taxes to become de-
linquent and were parties in interest in the sale 
made by the County." (Emphasis ours.) 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit I, dated March 21st, 1950, a letter 
from defendant Olson, makes the statement that he had 
leased this land and other parties were to pay the taxes on 
it. 
However, in his testimony (Tr. 3-22) he repudiates all 
of these letters, except his first statement, and tries to set 
up an agency with C. I. Johnson and another with Ercil 
Johnson. His first statement that he did not know what 
interest he had in the property is the correct one. 
For more than eight years after the Lower Court held 
that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had commenced 
adverse possession on June 30th, 1941, the defendant paid 
no attention to his property. 
In Hammond v. Johnson, 92 Utah, 211, 94 Utah 20, 
66 P.2d 894, it is said: 
"It is elemental that an interruption of adverse 
user by the owner must be actual and not merely 
declarations or verbal protests. * * * Such inter-
ruption of the adverse claimant's occupancy or 
user, to stop the running of the statute, must be 
of the same definite character as must the adverse 
claimant's possession and user be to start the 
statute running. The interruption must be open, 
notorious, and under claim of right such as to 
manifest an intention to repossess the property 
and dispossess the occupant, and be a challenge to 
his right and dominion. It must bear on its face 
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an unequivocal intention to take possession. Smith 
v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 1 Cal. (2d) 272, 34 P.2d 
713, Bonebrake v. Flourney, 133 Okl. 101, 271 
P. 658; 2 C. J. p. 96; Nelson v. Johnson, 189 Ky. 
815, 226 s. w. 94. 
Under the Lower Court's ruling that adverse possess-
ion commenced June 30th, 1941, and that adverser must pay 
taxes, defendant Olson in order to interrupt the adverse 
possession, must come in before June 30th, 1948 and take 
possession and pay taxes or the adverse possession becomes 
complete upon the paying of the taxes by the adverser. 
While the case of Hammond v. Johnson, supra, is a 
water case, the cases cited are real property actions and 
the rule quoted applies with like effect to real property 
, actions. 
v. 
DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT OLSON 
IS BARRED BY LACHES FROM ASSERTING HIS ANS-
WER, CROSS-COMPLAINTS AND COUNTER-CLAIM. 
The case of Petterson v. Ogden City, 111 Utah, 1925, 
176 P.2d 599, states: 
"Laches: 'is a negative equitable remedy, closely 
related in its nature and objective with estoppel, 
which deprives one of some right or remedy to 
which he would otherwise be entitled, because his 
delay in seeking it has operated to the prejudice 
of another.' 2 Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence 
1121. See 19 Am. Jur. 338-343." 
"Both laches and estoppel are bars which in cer-
tain circumstances may be raised to defeat a right 
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or claim a party otherwise would have. The courts 
refuse to give their aid to the party who has 
slept on his rights or who because of his actions 
or inaction when action was required is not fair-
ly entitled to relief." 
When the Abstract of Title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J) was 
forwarded to the defendant Olson in December 1949, it con-
tained the Oil and Gas Leases shown at pages 39 and 40 
and 53 and 54. It also contained the Tax Sale shown at 
page 60. He was told on December 7th, 1949 in a telephone 
conversation that there was an oil well drilling "about nine 
miles" distant from this land (Tr. 260). 
As set forth in the next preceding argument, defendant 
Olson went completely to sleep insofar as this land was 
concerned between 1933 and 1949, and took no personal 
interest in this land. He did not see the land between 1915 
and 1950 (Tr. 257). 
Then all of a sudden after finding out there were oil 
leases on the land and wells were drilling in the vicinity, 
he takes an especial interest in the land. He has spent 
considerable time here in Utah in connection with this law 
suit. Taking the value of the land for its normal uses 
into consideration, he has already spent more money than 
the land could be sold for when used for such purposes, 
many times over. 
Morley Dean has improved the land considerably as 
heretofore shown. He has spent considerable money upon 
it. When he bought the land there was a Decree Quieting 
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i 
Title of record and he received a Warranty Deed as here-
tofore shown. Likewise, as heretofore shown, he can now 
pasture 60 head of cattle during the summer upon this land. 
In the case of Livermore v. Beal et.al. (four cases), 
;- 64 P. 2d 987 (Cal App.) the court said: 
"It was also further held that the statute of limi-
tations did not control equity in applying the 
principle of laches. 
"In view of the fact of the change in the value of 
lands by reason of the discovery of oil or gas 
therein, the language of Justice Brewer, quoted in 
the case of Troll v. City of St. Louis, 257 Mo. 626, 
168 S. W. 167, 175, and approved in the Grossman 
Case, is applicable here to wit: 'No doctrine is so 
wholesome, when wisely administrated, as that of 
laches. It prevents the resurrection of stale titles, 
and forbids the spying out from the records of 
ancient and abandoned rights. It requires of 
every owner that he take care of his property, and 
of every claiment that he make known his claims. 
It gives to the actual and longer possesor security, 
and induces and justifies him in all efforts to im-
prove and make valuable the property he holds,' 
etc. Or, in other words, one is not permitted to 
stand by while another develops property in which 
he claims an interest, and then, if the property 
proves valuable, assert a claim thereto, and, if it 
does not prove valuable, be willing that the losses 
incurred in the exploration be borne by the opposite 
party. This thought was expressed in one case 
by the following language: 'if the property proves 
good, I want it; if it is valueless, you keep it." 
_In this case, the Lower Court is barring the plaintiffs 
from recovering on the ground that they did not pay the 
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1947 taxes before they became delinquent on November 
30th, 1947, and not on the ground that they were not paid 
by the plaintiffs. The lower court found that plenty of 
time for adverse possession had elapsed. The plaintiffs 
did pay the taxes. Defendent Olsen was served with 
summons before the 1947, 1948 and 1949 taxes were paid, 
and if he had been so anxious about the payment of the 
taxes, he could have paid them himself before Dean paid 
them on December 30th, 1949. Can he be excused from not 
paying these taxes to interrupt the adverse possession of 
Dean, when the law requires him to pay them if he is to 
keep his title, and then take the property away from Dean 
after payment has been made by Dean? We think the ans-
wer is obvious. 
VI. 
THE LOWER COURT MADE SOME MINOR ERRORS 
IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECREE. 
In many cases in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree (Rec. 101-107), the Lower Court uses the 
words "plaintiff's intestate," "plaintiff administratrix," 
"she," "her" and other designations to indicate Frances H. 
Bowen as Administratrix of the Estate of J. Parry Bowen, 
Deceased. J. Parry Bowen conveyed all of his interest in 
the subject lands to Keith J .Bowen on April 26th, 1947 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit J, page 55). The deceased had no 
interest in the property at the time of the filing of this 
action on September 22nd, 1948. 
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Further, in finding 9, on page 100 of the record, in 
the second line the words "during the summer of 1941" 
should read "about March 20th or 21st of 1941" as shown 
in the Memorandum Decision, page 7, line 8. (Rec. 69). 
CONCLUSION. 
Plaintiffs contend that they should have judgment 
for the following reasons: 
1. That they had open, notorious, peaceable and con-
tinuous adverse possesion from September 30th, 1940, to 
January 9th, 1950, and paid all taxes which were levied 
and assessed according to law during that period. 
2. That defendent had no possession during the period 
set forth above and paid no taxes during said period, and is 
barred by limitations and laches from recovering. 
3. That the lower Court erred in carrying his findings 
of fact insofar as the legal effect of such findings of fact 
are concerned from his Morandum Decision into his Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree. 
4. That the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree are contrary to law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. STANLEY 
COLTON & HAMMOND 
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